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The problem with root cause
analysis
Mohammad Farhad Peerally,1 Susan Carr,2 Justin Waring,3
Mary Dixon-Woods1
INTRODUCTION
Attempts to learn from high-risk indus-
tries such as aviation and nuclear power
have been a prominent feature of the
patient safety movement since the late
1990s. One noteworthy practice adopted
from such industries, endorsed by health-
care systems worldwide for the investiga-
tion of serious incidents,1–3 is root cause
analysis (RCA). Broadly understood as a
method of structured risk identification
and management in the aftermath of
adverse events,1 RCA is not a single tech-
nique. Rather, it describes a range of
approaches and tools drawn from fields
including human factors and safety
science4 5 that are used to establish how
and why an incident occurred in an
attempt to identify how it, and similar
problems, might be prevented from hap-
pening again.6 In this article, we propose
that RCA does have potential value in
healthcare, but it has been widely applied
without sufficient attention paid to what
makes it work in its contexts of origin,
and without adequate customisation for
the specifics of healthcare.7 8 As a result,
its potential has remained under-realised7
and the phenomenon of organisational
forgetting9 remains widespread (box 1).
Here, we identify eight challenges facing
the usage of RCA in healthcare and offer
some proposals on how to improve learn-
ing from incidents.
The unhealthy quest for ‘the’ root cause
The first problem with RCA is its name.
By implying—even inadvertently—that a
single root cause (or a small number of
causes) can be found, the term ‘root
cause analysis’ promotes a flawed reduc-
tionist view.10 Incident investigation in
the aftermath of an adverse event is
intended to identify the latent and active
factors contributing to the genesis of a
particular adverse event,4 but too often
results in a simple linear narrative that
displaces more complex, and potentially
fruitful, accounts of multiple and inter-
acting contributions to how events really
unfold.7 10–12 This is a tendency exacer-
bated by use of some RCA techniques
(such as timelines or the ‘five whys’) that
tend to favour a temporal narrative rather
than a wider systems view.
Box 1 Lessons not learnt
This example provides a summary of a real
case that occurred in a hospital and the
failure to learn from the incident in spite
of a root cause analysis.
In a large acute hospital, a patient
underwent a routine cataract surgery—an
operation with a minimal risk profile—led
by an experienced ophthalmologist. The
wrong lens was inserted during the oper-
ation. The error was promptly recognised
postoperatively; the patient was returned
to the operating room and the procedure
was safely redone.
A subsequent root cause analysis identi-
fied that two lenses were in the operating
room, one (the wrong one) brought in by
an operating department assistant and the
other by the surgeon. The investigation
report identified that having more than
one lens in the operating room and a
failure in the double-checking process had
caused the incident. The action plan
included the development of a new proto-
col emphasising the individual responsibil-
ity of the surgeon to select the appropriate
lens, a training programme, improved
documentation and a poster emphasising
the importance of double checks.
One year later, in the same hospital, a
different patient with a different surgeon
had the same procedure. Once again, the
wrong lens was implanted. This time, the
staff member who chose the wrong lens
was the surgeon.
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Questionable quality of RCA investigations
Once an adverse event is classified as meeting the def-
inition of a serious incident, an RCA is supposed to
involve the convening of a skilled multidisciplinary
investigation team, preferably with representations
from risk management personnel and clinical teams.13
Over a predefined timeframe, which is mandated in
some countries (60 days in the UK, 45 days in the
USA),3 14 this team collects and analyses data and for-
mulates an action plan.13 However, challenges per-
taining to the quality of this process abound. The task
facing the investigation team is far from straightfor-
ward: the events underlying an incident have to be
reconstructed from many different sources of varying
degrees of reliability, usefulness and accessibility,
ranging from hospital records, staff interviews and
statements, to records of workforce rotas.15 The infor-
mation obtained directly from healthcare workers is
influenced by their willingness and ability to provide
relevant data16 17 and by nature of the relationships
and conversations between investigators and other sta-
keholders.18 The involvement of patients and fam-
ilies affected by the incident is wildly variable, with
only limited evidence-based guidance on how it can
best be done.19 Yet, despite the complexities, sensi-
tivities and challenges of this work, RCAs in health-
care are typically conducted by local teams, not the
expert accident investigators who are proficient in
systems thinking and human factors, cognitive in-
terviewing, staff engagement and data analysis that
are characteristic of other high-risk industries.20–22
Further, inconsistent use is made of the various
investigative tools that are available.15 23 As a result,
exemplary practice in the analysis of healthcare inci-
dents is rare.24 25
Political hijack
Constrained by strict timelines, and skewed by hind-
sight bias26 and lack of independence from the
organisation where the event took place, RCAs in
healthcare often end up a compromise between
‘depth of data and accuracy of the investigation’.16
The quest to complete an investigation on time and
produce a report risks goal displacement, where the
report is seen as the end product rather than the
beginning of a learning cycle. Reports themselves,
influenced by the need to preserve interpersonal
relationships and by hierarchical tensions and parti-
san interests,8 16 27–29 may not always reflect the
content of discussions during investigations nor the
realities of what happened.15 16 Investigating teams
may end their analysis once they have reached a
cause of mutual convenience, perhaps one that
edits out causes (and thus solutions) deemed to be
beyond the remit or capacities of the organisation16
and that occludes deeper organisational and socio-
political dynamics.7 15 16
Poorly designed or implemented risk controls
The key goal of RCA is to prevent similar events from
recurring.7 10 16 But few studies have investigated the
nature and effectiveness of risk control strategies stem-
ming from RCA investigations in healthcare. The
available evidence points to the endemic tendency of
investigators to settle for administrative and perhaps
‘weaker’ solutions (such as reminders) rather than
those that address the latent causes, such as poorly
designed technology or defective operational sys-
tems.8 16 30–32 Again, some of the reasons for this lie in
the limited expertise of local investigation teams in
selecting and designing appropriate risk controls.7 30 33
Only limited guidance is available21 33–37 and what is
available may not be sufficiently attentive to the speci-
fics of the healthcare context. Yet poorly designed or
ineffectual corrective actions may do harm.31 32 Among
other unintended consequences, risk migration, where
attempts to mitigate a risk create new risks, may easily
occur.38 39 Recommended actions may also, of course,
result in little change,7 30 40 especially (but not only)
when senior managers are not involved in the gener-
ation of action plans and do not support their imple-
mentation.41 42 Despite the time and effort invested in
RCAs,7 40 43 few incentives exist to follow-up formally
on action plans:8 44 estimates of implementation rates
vary between 45% and 70%.31 45
Poorly functioning feedback loops
For learning to occur, several conditions must be satis-
fied. Among the most important of these are the
sharing of the outcomes of incident analysis with
those involved, those who reported, and those likely
to be affected in the future, especially in implement-
ing recommendations. Evidence in other fields sug-
gests that learning from events does not happen by
itself:46 purposeful intent is needed both to dissemin-
ate the findings47 and ensure that the recommended
actions made salient and actionable.46 Yet, as currently
practised, feedback mechanisms in healthcare RCAs
function poorly, contributing to the disenchantment
of staff48 49 and frustrating the kind of double-loop
learning50 needed to secure change.
Disaggregated analysis focused on single organisations
and incidents
The current RCA approach favours analysis of individ-
ual incidents in isolation and within bounded organisa-
tions. The consequent tendency to generate localised
action plans that are not shared more widely may result
in failure to disseminate painfully acquired learning
and to address deeper, institutionally engrained patient
safety concerns.21 51 Single incident analysis also frus-
trates the organisation’s ability to assess its vulnerability
to recurring events.52 Organisations’ inability to effect-
ively prioritise actions may lead to an unwarranted
commitment of resources to averting specific very rare
events rather than addressing the conditions that
The problem with…
418 Peerally MF, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2017;26:417–422. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2016-005511
 o
n
 17 July 2019 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/
BM
J Qual Saf: first published as 10.1136/bmjqs-2016-005511 on 23 June 2016. Downloaded from 
allowed the event to occur. Though mechanisms for
aggregating learning from incidents and creating alerts
do exist in some countries, their impact to date has
been limited: similar events often recur in the same or
similar organisations (box 1), suggesting failure to learn
both within and across organisations.24
Confusion about blame
Though healthcare is often exhorted to embrace a
‘no-blame’ culture, the extent to which this urging is
based on a correct understanding of what happens in
other high-risk industries is questionable.15 53
Investigators in other industries do not set out with a
remit to assign blame,20 but that does not mean that
individual or organisational culpability is forever
sequestered. The vast majority of mistakes and other
errors are the result of systems defects that need to be
corrected, but when blatant transgressions, neglect or
unacceptable behaviour is found, it is clearly wrong to
write accountability out of the picture.54 Nor is
no-blame the reality in practice, since disciplinary,
institutional and legal (civil and criminal) processes
continue to operate and are highly visible to health-
care practitioners and managers, yet may appear arbi-
trary and unsatisfactory both to them and to patients
and families. A ‘just culture’ is increasingly promoted
in many organisations to balance the disparity
between individual blame and organisational account-
ability.55 This approach, however, comes with pro-
blems of its own when applied to incident
investigation in healthcare. For instance, some of the
more visible features of the just culture philosophy in
incident investigation is the use of prescriptive algo-
rithms and decision tools (such as culpability tree) to
objectify culpability. Such ‘calculus-like logic’56 may
imply that actions committed by staff are binary
(either acceptable or unacceptable) without appropri-
ate appreciation of the messiness of the system in
which the action occurred.56 57
The problem of many hands
RCA is further challenged by the problem of many
hands, which describes the problem that many actors
and their actions may contribute to an outcome, yet
no individual is responsible either for that outcome or
for fixing the problems that caused it.58 This problem,
which is endemic in healthcare, makes it difficult to
address hazards that arise at the level of the system,
since many of the actors that are implicated in hazards
—including, for example, drug and equipment suppli-
ers—are outside the direct control of individual care
organisations. RCA investigations may fail to assign
responsibility to such actors, instead reabsorbing
responsibility into the organisation where the incident
occurred. These organisations typically lack the legal
mandate, resources and structural authority necessary
to make the changes required.
DISCUSSION
RCA is a promising approach with considerable face
validity as a way of producing learning from things
that have gone wrong. But it has consistently failed to
deliver benefits on the scale or quality needed. The
eight problems we have discussed here mean that, too
often, RCA results in the tombstone effect: though its
purpose is to guard against a similar incident in the
future, it may instead function primarily as a proced-
ural ritual, leaving behind a memorial that does little
more than allow a claim that something has been
done.59 60 Incident investigation clearly will continue
to play an important role in making healthcare safer,
but it must first get better at doing what it does.
The first step in securing improvement is likely to
involve the professionalisation of incident investiga-
tion: those conducting it need specialist expertise in
underlying theories, ergonomics, human factors and
hands-on experience of analytical methods.20 For
these reasons, the establishment of professional inves-
tigatory bodies, such as the one shortly to be launched
in the UK, are welcome—though the scope, reach and
impact of such bodies will need careful monitoring.
Second, the role of patients and relatives in the inves-
tigative process needs to be recognised and valued.
Such engagement has the potential to generate a
unique perspective of the service provided from the
end-user’s perspective and may foster dialogue that is
informative to both causal analysis and design of risk
controls.61 The psychological and emotional readiness
of patients and families involved in the investigative
process needs to be considered, along with the matur-
ity and ability of the organisation to facilitate such a
process within the appropriate legal framework.
Transparency on the agreed level of involvement is
paramount from the start and the outcomes of investi-
gations should be available to patients and relatives,
though clarity on how this should best be done is not
yet available.19 Third, better understanding of the role
of blame is needed. The dissonance caused by claims of
no-blame or even just culture and the reality is a source
of confusion and distress in relation to RCAs. To
address current confusions, clarity is needed on the dis-
tribution of responsibility between bodies investigating
incidents (whose prime mandate would be to promote
learning) and other bodies (including professional regu-
lators and the law courts), and in what instances the
investigative body needs to make referrals.22
Fourth, healthcare must focus increasingly on aggre-
gated analysis of incidents.31 32 45 62 63 Such a bird’s
eye view of incidents may facilitate prioritisation of
interventions, based on the harm associated with inci-
dents and also on the associated risks. Aggregated ana-
lyses can be performed at numerous levels of the
organisational hierarchy, for example, the micro
(within one department) and at the meso level (organ-
isational).41 At the national level, aggregated analyses
offer a way of identifying common themes across
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similar and apparently more disparate incidents31 32 45
and may also serve as a means of generating actions
that require collaborative efforts between healthcare
organisations or indeed between industry and health-
care. Such an example could be for instance product
redesigning—a solution that may not be identified
through the analysis of a single incident within one
department but may reveal itself as a recurring theme
when analysing multiple incidents across many organi-
sations. Linked to this, healthcare urgently needs to
develop and evaluate much better methods for design-
ing risk controls and other improvement actions. One
possibility that could be evaluated, for example, is
that of a hierarchy of risk controls.33 34 36 37 64 More
broadly, the use of active surveillance of issues that
have already been detected and monitoring of effect-
iveness of risk controls need to become a routine part
of the risk management process following RCAs.
Healthcare also needs to markedly improve its cap-
acity to evaluate, curate and share these risk controls.
Such an approach would help to address the problem
that organisations tend to constantly reinvent risk con-
trols, resulting in waste and the creation of new
risks.58 An easily accessible database with descriptions
of risk controls and contexts would enable lessons
learnt from one RCA to be shared widely and support
a participatory approach65 to organisational learning.
Finally, healthcare needs to do more to detect
hazards and assess risks proactively. RCA is essentially
retrospective, and depends crucially on an incident
being recognised as such, but that may not happen for
a variety of reasons: healthcare personnel may have
become habituated to particular practices or out-
comes, or fear and other negative emotions discourage
reporting. Though RCAs were imported from other
high-risk industries, the other tools and techniques
commonly used in those industries to assess systems
and assure their safety before an incident has occurred
—such as failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA),
hierarchical task analysis and so on—have had far less
attention in healthcare66 FMEA, in particular, may be
especially useful for the rigorous proactive risk assess-
ment of a select few but high-priority hazards.67 For
healthcare truly to become a learning system, action is
needed on multiple levels. RCAs have dominated for
too long as the principal means of generating learning.
The time has come to recognise both their opportun-
ities and their limits.
▸ RCA is a promising incident investigation technique bor-
rowed from other high-risk industries, but has failed to
live up to its potential in healthcare.
▸ A key problem with RCA is its name, which implies a
singular, linear cause.
▸ Other problems include the questionable quality of many
RCAs, their susceptibility to political hijack, their ten-
dency to produce poor risk controls, poorly functioning
feedback loops, failure to aggregate learning across inci-
dents and confusion about blame and responsibility.
▸ Implementation and evaluation of risk controls to elim-
inate or minimise identified hazards need to become a
more visible feature of the RCA process.
▸ To maximise learning, lessons learnt from incidents,
descriptions of implemented risk controls and their effect-
iveness need to be shared within and across organisations.
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